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NZ CONTEXT
‘Stocktake’ and Telecommunications Amendment 
Bill:
1. NZ’s low broadband uptake primarily attributable to a 
regulatory regime that inhibits intra-platform competition;
2. local loop unbundling will stimulate competition;
– lower prices, increased investment, greater product variety
3. ipso facto, broadband uptake will increase
Objective:
– NZ will be in OECD top quartile for broadband uptake per 
capita by 2015
– essential for NZ’s economic competitiveness in a 
‘knowledge economy’
BROADBAND UPTAKE
The outcome of interaction of supply and demand 
factors
– derived demand from the welfare consumers get from the 
applications enabled by access
• absolute (new Internet users) and relative (dial-up users)
– yet typically the sole demand side indicator used to assess 
the impact of regulatory interventions in supply-constrained 
markets
Key questions for regulatory intervention rationale
1. is there evidence of a supply-side problem warranting 
regulation?
2. to what extent does the chosen intervention address the 
identified supply-side problem?
3. how effective is the intervention likely to be in raising:
– broadband uptake?
– total welfare? 
W.R.T. THE ‘STOCKTAKE’ ANALYSIS
1. Are competition/regulation differences the best 
explanation for observed differences in 
broadband uptake?
2. Where is the theoretical and empirical evidence 
to support the ‘Stocktake’ assertions that:
• competition ‘problems’ are the cause of perceived low 
investment and low uptake?
• the chosen intervention (LLU) will increase uptake 
sufficient to meet Digital Strategy targets whilst having no 
effect on investment incentives?
• that the effects of the chosen intervention are superior to 
all other alternatives?
DOES NZ HAVE A SUPPLY-SIDE ‘PROBLEM’?
Information
– NZ had the highest Internet penetration rate in the world at 
September 2005 (76.3% of the population – ITU)
Availability
– Telecom DSL 3rd commercially available service in OECD 
(January 1999, following US and Canada)
– 3 near nationwide access technologies in 2006
– wireless, cable, fibre available in many urban areas
– no evidence of commercial application shortages, usage
• Internet banking, TradeMe
• but maybe some residential applications – e.g. IPTV
ABSOLUTE PRICES
RELATIVE PRICES; APPLICATIONS
Free local calling 
– ratio of broadband:dial-up prices in NZ 3.1:1 to 2:1 unrestricted; 
1.3:1 to 1.8:1 if buying tolls from same ISP 
– does not apply to business users – internationally high uptake and 
use of broadband accounts for NZ SMEs (10+ employees)
Dial-up a satisfactory substitute for many users
Consumers in general may not place a high premium on 
broadband speed, given current and likely future 
applications used
– broadband access positively correlated to income, but bandwidth 
usage negatively correlated 
• whilst Internet access appears to be an ‘essential good’, it is not clear 
that broadband access and the applications that can only be accessed 
via broadband are ‘essential’
BUT PRESUMING THERE IS A 
JUSTIFIABLE SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC 
POLICY REASON TO STIMULATE 
BROADBAND UPTAKE, HOW MUCH 
DIFFERENCE WILL LLU MAKE?
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE I
Despite strong LLU advocacy by policy groups (e.g. 
OECD, ERG), there is no clear empirical evidence 
supporting unbundling having a statistically 
significant effect on broadband uptake; the effect 
of inter-platform competition is much greater
– Distaso, Lupi, Manenti (2006)
• oligopoly competition model with differentiated products
• based on 14 EU countries, 2002-2004
– Denni and Gruber (2005)
• logistic model of technology diffusion
• US data 1999-2004
– Wallsten (2006)
• country-level panel dataset - OECD countries
• controlling for country and fixed year effects
• tests effects of different unbundling forms
ERG (05) 23 Diagram 1b page 4 (2005)
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INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE II
Despite claims that incumbents invest aggressively 
under LLU to retain market share, and that 
advocacy to the contrary is simply strategic 
behaviour designed to reduce regulation severity, 
unbundling appears to be associated with lower 
investment by incumbents
– theoretically predicted, using incentive-based models
• e.g. de Bijl and Peitz, 2004; Crandall et al, 2002)
– investment in the US increased markedly following the 
removal of LLU obligations on new fibre connections (Hazlett, 
2005)
No type of unbundling appears to affect the 
download speeds of incumbent broadband 
offerings Wallsten (2006)
– the only variable with consistent explanatory power is 
population density
EU INVESTMENT TRENDS 2001-2004
(London Economics, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006)
IMPLICATIONS FOR NZ
Risks, uncertainties are large; quantifiable benefits 
small
Increases in broadband uptake under LLU:
– highly uncertain
– likely to be small compared to other effects
LLU will almost certainly alter investment incentives
– e.g. Telecom’s NGN
– investment in alternative platforms
LLU cannot directly address demand-side issues
– which are very likely consequences of other regulatory 
interventions
A policy with proven welfare gains?
Or a potentially costly ‘fashion statement’?
On the basis of the (absence) of  analysis in 
the ‘Stocktake’, NZ’s legislation, the 
proposed policy ‘bets the farm’ on the 
basis of a few, highly conjectural,
assumptions made by policy analysts in 
very different market contexts
